A Christian-Social-Democratic Update for Germany’s reason of state
Learning the Language of Power!

1.

When German chancellor Friedrich Merz announces that in these hard and challenging times Germany must “learn the language of power,” two things are clear: this is not about phrasing political statements in different ways. The intended meaning becomes clear in the accusation leveled against the president of the enemy state currently at war, Russia: He only understands the “language of force,” and consequently, this is how he must be dealt with, rather than with the language of diplomacy. The “lesson” announced by the chancellor here is thus about how to position and assert his nation as a global actor capable of wielding force — both in its dealings with Russia and on the world stage in general. Secondly, it is also clear for the Federal Republic’s Commander-in-Chief that a policy involving threats and the use of military force is not, in fact, a new language that has to be learned from scratch; rather, it is a practice already honed over four years of conflict with the Russian adversary. Considerably more of this is required: this is what Merz wants Germany to learn.

Merz’ statement is phrased in the spirit of national self-criticism regarding Berlin’s past exercise of power. This reflects the characteristic style of his coalition of conservatives and social democrats, which emphasizes that this ramp-up of national power projection is not merely a matter of quantity — as if the project to build “Europe’s strongest conventional army” would still be misunderstood in such a way. Germany is working toward a new status as a power ready and able to wage war — if necessary — against states that understand no other language, most notably and exemplarily against the nuclear power Russia. His announcement entails the prospect of sacrifices the German people are not used to making. Above all, however, the German people are promised — and the rest of the world is informed — that this country is going to play an independent, active role in global affairs in a manner distinctly different from the past.

2.

This is in fact where Germany is lagging behind, at least in the eyes of those in charge. For it is not Germany that is, for the time being, defining the issues in the international language of power. The relevant decisions are made in other places. This has been true for more than four years with regard to Russia — a challenge Germany managed to meet appropriately under its former government: through a €100bn off-budget fund, and by acting as the leading voice of NATO’s European pillar — a pillar that succeeded in transforming a high-handed “special military operation” by mighty Russia into a protracted war of attrition and a strategic humiliation for the hostile nuclear power. For over a year now, MAGA-America has been setting the standards and conditions for modern-day imperialism. And for Germany, this presents a challenge of an entirely different order. From now on, the Republic no longer has to deal with a world defined by the Western alliance under US leadership and with substantial German participation, subjected to their peace order (albeit one constantly violated, yet essentially highly effective) based on civil coercion and ruthless exploitation by great rivaling capitalist powers. That order is still working and has by no means simply vanished. Yet it has fundamentally been rendered ineffective and obsolete by a global policy of bilateral dominance, whereby the will of the American superpower is imposed on the world of states. This will consistently reserves its right to freely define its own terms while it is bent on revising any conditions that benefit others at America’s expense. This “MAGA imperialism” is introduced and enforced as the new premise governing the activities of all other nations through the uncompromisingly and openly extortionate use of the global market power of the American market and credit; and, as if any questions remained, through “special military operations” that are in fact carried out with unrivaled superior force and staged and interpreted to serve as an unmistakable deterrent.

3.

Like all members of the new imperialist family of nations, Germany finds itself in a position where it must regularly choose between few alternatives. It has the freedom to submit in a calculated manner. It can try its best to evade unreasonable demands — at the risk of being treated unkindly, ranging from being dismissed as irrelevant to being declared a problem. Refusing to comply provokes a hostile reaction; while this may not aim for a Trumpian “I’m taking over” — as is the case with those defined as America’s enemies — it is nonetheless explicitly intended to punish. America’s demands that result from its new “language of force” apply to every candidate on its list of states that have to submit to its control but have a specific meaning for Germany. For decades, the pre-reunification Federal Republic first, and later the “reunified” Germany was not only benefiting from, but actually thriving on being an active and actively profiting part of the imperialist collective known as “the West,” which has been canceled by the new US president. This participation provided, under changing conditions, the only alternative to solve Germany’s unchanged existential problem: the nation is too big for the modest role of a protégé of the American global power, yet too small to make adequate use of the capabilities it had acquired in this role to satisfy its ambitions as an autonomous power. “Solving” its problem has never meant — and certainly does not now — that the state was satisfied with its status in the alliance: under the security umbrella of the great alliance, Germany created a European Union for its own purposes. As a leading member, it does not have the final say, but it does have more influence than it would if it were acting alone and on its own.

With America’s new imperialism, this Union is losing the major prerequisite for its imperialist success — namely, the security policy premise underpinning its peculiar form of supranationalism — a loss that is making itself felt quite tangibly in the case of the Ukraine war, the ultimate test for this European power collective.

4.

For Germany—faced with the existential contradiction of being too small, as a single power, for the status it has achieved as a global power and for its agenda of self-assertion, yet far too large for the unthinkable alternative of imperialist modesty — there is only one conclusion to be drawn: Europe becomes all the more critical as Germany’s sphere of influence and power base. This applies, first, in general terms; second, precisely where participation in Western global power via NATO is ceasing to be relevant — namely, in matters of inter-state force; and third, specifically regarding the confrontation with Russia, where the EU and the NATO collective must now demonstrate military autonomy in the absence of American leadership and protection.

The Chancellor views this as the primary and crucial task of his policy:

“We’ll make sure that there is new scope for action in Europe as well. The world is evolving into a ‘great power order’ — a situation that presents challenges for us. We can feel how the actors within this new power structure are influencing our lives and constraining our options. At the outset of this government policy statement, I want to state this very clearly: under these conditions, a united Europe represents — more than ever before — the single most important guarantee we have for our future in Germany. This has never been more palpable than in recent days and weeks. United, but only if we are standing united, do we European states possess real power potential in this dawning new era. This power potential is immense. Yet we must recognize it and also harness it together. I observe a strong determination among our European partners to utilize this power — not least to uphold rules and fairness among the world’s nations, preserving them where possible and renewing them wherever we can. We all stand to benefit from this. The entire world stands to benefit from this.” (Merz, Government Policy Statement, March 18, 2026)

The Chancellor is invoking a form of European cohesion that entails the inherent, perpetual contradiction for all parties involved: what is required is a sovereign renunciation of sovereignty — one that is irreversible and thus demands a binding commitment that can only be brought about by a decision to accept effective supranationalism, specifically through submitting to a superordinate true sovereign. For Germany — with its aspiration to gain national stature as the driving force behind a united Europe — this contradiction presents itself in an acute form: the country expects a degree of subordination from its partners that it rules out for itself.

But Germany can provide a political concept for Europe that could pave the way toward a solution. Sub-coalitions of the willing would point in the right direction:

“Foreign minster Wadephul has called for far-reaching reforms of the European Union to enhance the bloc’s capacity to act in the face of global challenges. At the heart of the proposals he presented in Berlin on Wednesday are the abolition of the unanimity principle in foreign policy and a reduction in the size of the EU Commission in the wake of future enlargements… The principle of qualified majority voting should apply to the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the future. In addition, the use of so-called ‘enhanced cooperation’ should be made easier. This would allow smaller groups of states to move forward in specific policy areas without requiring the immediate consent of all 27 EU members.” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 7, 2026)

Of course, this would not solve the EU’s fundamental sovereignty dilemma — a dilemma intensified by the progress now required. Moreover, the German government faces the additional problem that the general thrust of American MAGA policy is explicitly and resolutely opposed to the European unity that Germany requires and actively promotes. For the Trump administration, the EU — even in its current form — represents an anti-American affront to its strategy of using absolute superiority to confront the world’s sovereign powers one by one and relegate them to their respective status of inferiority. Consequently, the administration supports all efforts by European governments and parties to “resist Brussels,” disregards the Union’s competencies in trade and related matters, cultivates separate ties with individual countries, and so on. In doing so, it inevitably encounters resistance from the “Brussels-oriented” political establishment — both in Germany and across Europe — as well as from other governments that view their own autonomy (and critical stance toward America) as being under attack. Yet, particularly for Germany — given its leadership position that is still under development, especially regarding the proxy war against Russia in Ukraine (which is no longer a truly joint effort) and the EU’s future readiness for war — the backing of the American global power remains all but indispensable. However, that power is no longer the solution either; rather, it is at the same time a serious — if not entirely unacceptable — obstacle to German-European emancipation. The fact that this global power cannot be aggressively rebuffed for its opposition to the European project actually sharpens the necessity — and Germany’s determination — to make that project succeed. After all, as the stereotypical cliché goes, only a united Europe can secure its rightful place alongside global powers like China and the USA — and stand up to nuclear-armed Russia — on equal footing. Germany refuses to settle for anything less than the status of third global power; it judges the Europe that must help it achieve this rank by that very criterion, as it is — and would have to remain — too small to attain such status on its own.

At any rate, the German chancellor is already taking liberties when dealing with his self-proclaimed best friend in the White House. He flatly rejects the invitation to play a subordinate role in Trump’s — already spectacularly won — “special military operation” against Iran’s mullah regime, with a firm: “wasn’t asked,” “would have advised against it,” “see no strategy,” and the bottom line — ”not our war!” This is despite the inevitable retort that, by the same logic, Europe’s regional war in Ukraine is not America’s war either. Yet Germany is committed to continuing — and certainly financing — that conflict for years to come, even without US assistance. The new German language of power is evidently sufficient for this purpose. And it is far from having said its final word. Work is already underway on the script for a European and global policy that — naturally — has absolutely nothing to do with imperialism.

5.

What is required first and foremost is to ready the nation to serve as a viable foundation for a substantial growth and the necessary qualitative advancement of German power. To this end, the ruling coalition secured the necessary financial leeway even before taking office, establishing a special fund for combat readiness with no upper limit. It has also broadly defined the mandate its people are to carry out: an agenda whose implementation will get Germany moving — providing ample material to be explained every three months.

• The expansion of personnel for “Europe’s strongest conventional army” is only just beginning, and it cannot be achieved without a greater measure of war-ready patriotism — not merely as a mindset for recruits. In this context, the “language of power” that must be learned anew is to be taken quite literally.
• The corresponding defense budget — that enormous, credit-financed outlay for state consumption that is, in capitalist terms, guaranteed to be unproductive — poses a particularly appealing question for the global financial sector (and the European one in particular): just how high an interest rate can it charge such a solid debtor for such profligacy? At some point down the line — unfortunately not beforehand — it will become clear whether the nation’s productive capital has expanded alongside the Bundeswehr [German Armed Forces] arsenals to the extent that these new instruments of force prove to be an engine for economic growth; whether speculators’ confidence has grown in lockstep with the credibility of the nation’s readiness to use force; or whether the devaluation of the expanded credit money will devour the growth of the power of capitalist wealth. The fact that — alongside figures like the German Defense Minister, Mr. Pistorius, and the Minister of Economics, Mrs. Reiche — other Eurozone nations are also involved in this contentious issue through their fiscal performance (specifically regarding the ratio of public debt to capital accumulation), and that intra-European competition for industrial locations and the success of the arms industry further stimulates business, complicates matters significantly. It will complicate the reckoning ultimately presented by the community of financial speculators, European fiscal policy in general, and Germany’s specific role in shaping that policy.
• National economic growth — already a prerequisite for everything the state and its people can afford within a capitalist order, and encompassing not just the national economy but the pan-European one as well — is thus the absolute condition for sustainably funded defense budgets. At the same time, however, the reverse holds true: ultimately, military readiness is the supreme political objective, one that even capital accumulation must serve. Consequently, the rate and volume of profit generation will become all the more critical. Because the unholy trinity of US tariffs, Chinese competition, and acute disruptions to global trade is hindering German economic growth, the “honorable task” facing German and pan-European class society becomes ever more pressing: to generate more profit — an increase that the arms industry, financial markets, and the state budget so absolutely depend on.
• The specific measures the government must take to achieve this are set down in a catalog of tax and social policy objectives, all grouped under the methodical title of “reforms.” Officials unequivocally frame the purpose of these reforms — to elevate Germany to the status of a world power commensurate with its ambitions, utilizing Europe as the vehicle — as an unavoidable necessity, citing Trump’s America, China’s competitive might, and Putin’s war as the driving factors. What is being signaled here, however, is not the imperialist offensive that is the actual issue at stake, but rather a defensive response to a national emergency. This is certainly well-intentioned — in the sense that the government is not to blame and is regretting the situation. Yet the coalition fails to convey the stance of a national renewal — anything even remotely resembling “MAGA” — and indeed may not even possess such a vision itself. Instead, the governing partners are questioning one another regarding the relative importance of every single item in their reform package — a package supposedly absolutely essential and necessarily sweeping in scope. In turn, they engage in self-criticism concerning shortcomings in decision-making and implementation — shortcomings that can only truly be characterized as such if one measures all these contradictory projects against the harsh yardstick of Mr. Dobrindt’s, the Interior Minister’s, anti-migration policy. That policy is, of course, certainly capable of generating democratic enthusiasm among a public steeped in xenophobia. So there is that, at least.
• For this reason, however, the coalition faces yet another major challenge regarding its pan-European, anti-Russian global power policy: the growing support for the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD). To implement this policy, the government certainly does not rely on public enthusiasm — something it already lacks within its own parties and parliamentary groups. Yet, by invoking “necessities” that entail burdens for the people — and, as the heaviest burden, an insult to the nationalist, resentful sense of justice cultivated by Merz & Co. themselves — the government proves an opposition right, one that does not share the immanent critique of the official reform plans, as do the various factions of the governing parties themselves or the relentlessly constructive Greens. The AfD frames everything the coalition does or plans — claiming to be driven by unavoidable practical constraints — as crafted by the “cartel of established parties” and a result of their global agenda: specifically, as a betrayal of the nation’s sacred egoism, which tolerates neither immigration nor “Brussels.” This fundamental opposition — championing the ideal of a right-wing radical “alternative republic” — poses a persistent challenge to the proponents of the prevailing German reason of state for two reasons. First, regarding most points of the reform agenda into which the coalition distills its grand imperialist project — and certainly regarding the underlying right-wing mindset — there is far greater consensus between the conservative Chancellor’s party and the AfD than there is with the “red” coalition partner. Standing as a “firewall” (”Brandmauer”) between these two camps of full-blooded patriots is nothing less — but also nothing more — than the “old” Republic’s global and European politics, and in particular its anti-Russian reason of state. Second, this policy is challenged by more than just the AfD: opposition to it — representing one side of the EU’s sovereignty dilemma — is a constant presence in all partner countries (including, historically, the Federal Republic itself) and will gain further traction as efforts toward supranational integration intensify. Finally, a third point: nationalism ranging from EU-critical to anti-European is being legitimized in the broadest sense by the Trumpian MAGA chauvinism — a movement in which Europe’s “sovereigntists” recognize themselves, and which, conversely, the leading figures of that American global power cherish and promote as the characteristic of the Christian race.

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The “language of power” that the Republic must learn interprets the world in terms of a government statement or a declaration of war. There is nothing here to set straight. Yet everything still remains to be explained.

© GegenStandpunkt 2026